

The Plurality of Europe

Identities and Spaces

The Plurality of Europe

Identities and Spaces

Contributions made at an international conference
Leipzig, 6–9 June 2007

Edited
by
Winfried Eberhard and Christian Lübke

in cooperation with
Madlen Benthin



LEIPZIGER UNIVERSITÄTSVERLAG 2010

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der deutschen
Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet
über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording,
or otherwise, without the prior permission of Leipziger Universitätsverlag GmbH.

SPONSORED BY THE



Federal Ministry
of Education
and Research

Cover design employing the work „Europa und der Stier“ by Gisela Schürenberg

© Printed with kind permission of Adrienne Schürenberg

© Leipziger Universitätsverlag GmbH 2010

Translation: KERN AG, Sprachendienste, Frankfurt/Main

Cover: berndtstein|grafikdesign, Berlin

Typesetting: Madlen Benthin

Production: Arnold & Domnick, Leipzig

ISBN 978-3-86583-486-7

Contents

| | |
|--|---|
| The plurality of Europe: identities and spaces. Synopsis Winfried Eberhard and Christian Lübke | 1 |
|--|---|

Opening

| | |
|--|---|
| Opening address Prof. Dr Winfried Eberhard Director of the GWZO/Leipzig | 9 |
|--|---|

| | |
|---|----|
| Words of welcome Dr Eva-Maria Stange State Minister of Science and the Fine Arts in the Free State of Saxony | 17 |
|---|----|

| | |
|--|----|
| Ulrich Schüller Head of the Directorate for Education and Research Policy Issues at the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) | 21 |
|--|----|

| | |
|---|----|
| Dr Georg Girardet Mayor and Culture Councillor of the City of Leipzig | 25 |
|---|----|

| | |
|--|----|
| Prof. Dr Wolfgang Fach Prorector for Teaching and Studies at the University of Leipzig | 29 |
|--|----|

Lectures

| | |
|--|----|
| The process of identifying with Europe and research in the social sciences Jean-Michel Baer | 33 |
|--|----|

| | |
|--|----|
| Entwinement as a main feature of European history Władysław Bartoszewski | 39 |
|--|----|

National and regional identities: competition versus integration

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Introduction. Unity out of diversity? Approaching European identities from the perspective of cultural history | 49 |
| Konrad H. Jarausch | |
| Cantat avis quaevis, sicut rostrum sibi crevit. The role of national, regional and minority languages in the formation of identity | 53 |
| Roland Willemyns | |
| Communication of identities through national atlases | 61 |
| Ferjan Ormeling | |
| German Central Europe and the Polish Intermarium: mythical memory – political calculation | 73 |
| Leszek Żyliński | |
| National history in opposition to regional history? | 83 |
| Miroslav Hroch | |

Cultural landscapes in Europe: emergence and relevance

| | |
|--|------------|
| Introduction | 97 |
| Matthias Hardt and Christian Lübke | |
| Europe: from natural conditions to used landscape | 101 |
| Hansjörg Küster | |
| The Europeanisation of the Baltic: a clear case of qualitative change | 115 |
| Nils Blomkvist | |
| Europe along the Danube | 123 |
| Walter Pohl | |
| The many faces of the Mediterranean: reconstructions of the past and the challenges of the present | 135 |
| Maurice Aymard | |

Changing confessional and religious identities

| | |
|--|-----|
| Introduction Winfried Eberhard | 153 |
| “Spain is no longer a Catholic country.” Aspects of a profound change in religious identity in Spain since 1975 Carlos Collado Seidel | 159 |
| Religiosity, confessionalism and social identity in Eastern and Central Europe Miklós Tomka | 173 |
| Orthodox Eastern and South Eastern Europe: exception or special case? Vasilios N. Makrides | 189 |
| Corporation, equality and nationality: on the paradigmatic significance of Jewish history in the modern era Dan Diner | 205 |

Social patterns of regional and national identity-building: consumption and tourism

| | |
|---|-----|
| Introduction. Consumption and consumer cultures in contemporary Europe Hannes Siegrist | 215 |
| Consumption in the 20 th century. Regionalisation, Europeanisation, Americanisation? Manuel Schramm | 219 |
| Time, space, and tourism. Tourist consumption in the long 19 th century; between localisation, nationalisation and Europeanisation Hasso Spode | 233 |
| Regionalisation of a chemical product? National, regional and local identifications of kitchen salt in Germany, Austria and France Jakob Vogel | 247 |

European cultures of remembrance: dialogue and conflict

| | |
|---|------------|
| Introduction Stefan Troebst | 267 |
| The change in French cultures of remembrance Étienne François | 269 |
| The end of reconciliation: the politicisation of memory in Spain Sören Brinkmann | 275 |
| Fissured memories: memory cultures in South Eastern Europe Wolfgang Höpken | 289 |
| Russian historical memory and the interplay of myth, identity and official history policy Jutta Scherrer | 297 |
| The year 1945 as a European <i>lieu de mémoire</i> ? Stefan Troebst | 313 |

Creation and integration of a European economic space

| | |
|---|------------|
| Introduction Rolf H. Hasse | 325 |
| European globalisation: political overexpansion of the desired level of integration? Rolf H. Hasse | 327 |
| Trade Unions in the European Economic Area: co-designers or followers? Otto Jacobi | 339 |
| New political challenges for the European Union: an inventory Reinhard Rode | 351 |

Reading, learning and researching; between national standards and a transnational community of knowledge

| | |
|---|------------|
| Introduction Frank Hadler and Wolfgang Hörner | 365 |
| Learning in Europe – learning for Europe? Eliška Walterová | 369 |
| The character of the German publisher in the 19 th century Frédéric Barbier | 383 |
| The significance of informal education in and for Europe: influences in the long, medium and short term Klaus Schleicher | 393 |
| Universities in Europe between national traditions and transnational change Peter Lundgreen | 409 |

The arts: universal languages versus national cultures

| | |
|---|------------|
| Introduction Eberhard Lämmert | 427 |
| Music as a search for national identity and a transnational offering. The functions of singing together Friedhelm Brusniak | 433 |
| Works on differences. Literary reflections on Russian culture under the duress of a European definition Georg Witte | 451 |
| National style as a construction of art history Jindřich Vybíral | 465 |
| Theatre and festival in Europe: from community to network Matthias Warstat | 475 |

Transnationalisation in the history and culture of Europe

| | |
|---|------------|
| Introduction. Transnationalisation in Europe Matthias Middell | 493 |
| On the road to a transnational history of Europe Matthias Middell | 497 |
| Portals of globalisation Michael Geyer | 509 |
| European history and questions of historical space Dominic Sachsenmaier | 521 |

Europe and the others: the perspective from the outside

| | |
|---|------------|
| Introduction Ulrike Freitag | 537 |
| A single God for Europe. What the advent of Judaism, Christianity and Islam meant for the history of Europe Michael Borgolte | 541 |
| Human rights as a European challenge to China Klaus Mühlhahn | 551 |
| European civilisation from the perspective of the Muslim World Michael Dusche | 567 |
| Concepts of Europe in Africa David Simo | 577 |

Europeanising conflicts

| | |
|--|------------|
| Introduction | |
| Peter Krüger and Markus Kotzur | 595 |
| Accelerated change. From the fragile system of the Peace of Westphalia to the instable system of the pentarchy. Fourteen theses | |
| Heinz Duchhardt | 605 |
| The Congress of Vienna 1814/15. Intersection in the process of transformation from the Europe of the Old Regime to the Europe of Modernity | |
| Wolf D. Gruner | 611 |
| Public international law and historical understanding. The development of public international law in the interwar period | |
| Andreas Paulus | 635 |
| The Second World War and European unification | |
| Wilfried Loth | 647 |

Appendix

| | |
|------------------------------|------------|
| List of contributors | 663 |
| List of illustrations | 677 |

Cantat avis quaevis, sicut rostrum sibi crevit.

**The role of national, regional and minority languages
in the formation of identity**

Roland Willemys

Introduction

There are at present 23 official languages in the European Union (EU). One of the consequences is that there are, for example, 506 possible language combinations for the interpreters at a parliamentary session. This does not seem to be a financial problem, since the amount every EU citizen pays for all the translation work is only € 2.28 per year.¹

How to deal with the technical problems of multilingualism, however, is not the subject of my essay. Instead I wish to concentrate on the role that languages play in the formation of national and regional identity, and about what may be learned from this regarding the formation of a European identity. In addition to the 23 official languages mentioned, there are also regional and minority languages which must be included in our considerations. Every country with two or more languages is forced to regulate the use of language inside its borders and by its citizens on the basis of language planning and/or language legislation. In the not infrequent cases of problems which may arise with regard to the unity and continued existence of the nation, an attempt must be made to solve these or, better still, there should be future-directed planning with a view to averting them. It is obvious that this applies on an even larger scale to the EU, since the language problems of the member states can impair the functioning of the Union.

I will confine myself to three main areas: 1. Language and the formation of identity, 2. Linguistic diversity, and 3. Language planning for Europe.

I would like to start with a short anecdote. Alfred Biolek, well known to most of you from television, spent his youth in a village which is now in the Czech

¹ Knack, 10 January 2007, 77.

Republic, near the Polish border. In a talk show² he was asked how people in the village, in those days, could tell the difference between Germans, Czechs and Poles. His reply came without hesitation: by the language. If you spoke German you were a German, if you spoke Czech or Polish you were a Czech or a Pole. That is not actually as logical as it may seem. It does not happen very often, in a complex multilingual, multinational or multi-ethnic situation, that national groups can be distinguished on the basis of one single criterion, a so-called core value. In Biolek's village the core value was obviously language, but in other cases the core value could be, for instance, religion, customs, eating habits or a combination of these criteria.

1. Language and the formation of identity

Since about the turn of the 18th century, the so-called one-country-one-language thesis used to be very popular. It necessarily led to massive discrimination against minority languages and those who spoke them. At best they were compelled to acquire greater language skills than the speakers of the majority language. This may well be what Joshua Fishman had in mind when he produced his well-known remark: "The weak are always more likely to be bilingual than the strong." Allow me to point out that there is a big difference between officially multilingual countries and those where certain languages have only regional recognition. Belgium and Switzerland belong to the first category, and what distinguishes these countries is that they are made up of regions where, *de facto* or *de jure*, only one language is spoken. As a consequence, every citizen can use just one language and is on an equal footing with all his compatriots. In countries in the second category, such as Spain, there is only one official language. In autonomous regions, like Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, the regional language is recognised as well and can be used in all local spheres and domains. It does not have that status at national level, although in the autonomous regions everyone has the right to use the national language, and consequently the entire regional administration must be capable of functioning on a bilingual basis. In effect, therefore, we have here a case of dual discrimination. A third category is made up of countries like France, where there are any number of regional languages whose very existence goes unrecognised in the codes of law and whose speakers therefore have no language rights whatever. That of course is discrimination in its purest form. Furthermore, the relationship between languages in multilingual countries can be regulated on the basis of the territoriality principle or the personality principle, and that too can be important for the status of these languages and their speakers.

2 ARD (German TV) on 11 July 2004.

The unproven premise on which the one-country-one-language thesis rests is that a national identity is more likely to be formed, in a monolingual than in a multilingual country. Yet in Europe there are only two states which are de facto monolingual: Portugal and Iceland. All the others are, de jure or de facto, multilingual, and in some of them language policy and language planning are directed at enhancing national identity by denying a role to the minority languages and fostering the so-called national language. It is not at all easy to say what influence this has on the formation of European identity. As we will see, in certain countries an aloof attitude to one's own national identity can even lead to a stronger commitment to a European identity. But the role played by language in that process can be contradictory.

Serbian and Croatian politicians, for instance, have spent nearly two decades trying to convince people that two different languages are spoken in their two countries, now separated from each other. In 1984 the Luxembourg Parliament raised Luxembourgian to the status of an official language despite the fact that Luxembourgian is a German dialect (Moselle-Frankish) and German was already an official language. In the German-speaking parts of Switzerland the functions assumed by Swiss German have grown rapidly in recent times; that is to say, it is used by increasing numbers of people with increasing frequency in an increasing variety of situations and spheres, including, for quite some time now as a written language. It will probably not be long before this variant too will claim the status of an independent language. Similar examples could be listed more or less ad infinitum. Seen in this light, the one-country-one-language doctrine is a relic of 19th century romanticism and has little relevance to the present. The fact that language and political borders virtually never coincide in Europe has produced a situation in which there are many pluricentric languages and minority languages, and in which societal multilingualism has become widespread. This does not, however, rule out the possibility of a cross-border identity based on language. The speakers of French, Basque and Catalan, for example, may feel to belong to language communities bound together, across national boundaries, by their common language.

2. Language diversity

As my discussion of the first topic has revealed, the role of language is often both over- and under-estimated. In the second area under consideration, too, it could be helpful to realise that the role of a common language is far less self-evident than most people think. Let me give you some examples.

That Serbs and Croats can't accommodate each other has nothing to do with language. Even though they have a common language, they slaughtered each other mercilessly, on a massive scale, in the last decade of the 20th century. Catholics

and Protestants in Ireland have not been prevented by a common language from seeking to end each other's lives. On the other hand, many of them have always been antagonistic towards the English in spite of having adopted their language. Much the same applies to the Scots, who made it very clear at the last elections on 3 May 2007 that they had nothing against seceding from the United Kingdom, and they now have a First Minister who is also in favour of this. But there is not the slightest intention of making Scottish Gaelic the national language of a Scotland that might one day be independent. The USA, though involved in two world wars and attacks on Vietnam and Iraq, never suffered greater loss of life than during the Civil War. The Union and the Confederacy differed in many respects, but they did have the same language.

Identity-forming processes are concerned with "changing and/or competing identifications". Language is only one of the elements concerned, and it is not always the most important one. But sometimes it can play a substantial and even an unexpected role.

In section 1 of the conference programme, Winfried Eberhard writes the following: "Citing examples from several nations, we will discuss whether national identity – the relevance of which is indisputable even in contemporary Europe – is in danger of experiencing competition from or being marginalised by intensified ties to a nation's specific regions, which are occasionally also marked by languages, and the extent to which a sense of regional identity can be integrated into a sense of national or European allegiance."³ This approach is of great importance for our deliberations.

Many regions see the progressive unification of Europe and the EU as offering an opportunity to escape from the "suffocating embrace" of their national governments. It is not only regions with minority languages, like Corsica and Alsace, but also autonomous regions like Catalonia and the Basque Country and even majority regions like Flanders that hope that the process of European integration will bring about changes in their domestic political arrangements and, more specifically, a greater autonomy. Many regions would rather prefer to have a direct relationship to the EU, bypassing the national level. There is, thus, a remarkable contradiction between European integration on one hand and regionalism on the other. Language can play a crucial role in this, but does not have to. In the case of Catalonia, language factors are certainly of decisive importance; in Scotland they are negligible.

What the EU decides to do about this is of course not a linguistic matter, but purely and simply a political one, which can, however, have a significant impact on European identity and unity. The interplay of international, national and regional identities is a thorny issue, and conflict among those identities is inevitable.

3 Cf. the introduction by the editors of this volume.

No solution can be expected as long as the Union only recognises states and not regions. Nor does the fact that more and more countries are joining the EU make things any easier.

3. Language planning in the EU

The new EU Commissioner for Multilingualism, Leonard Urban, who took office on 1 January 2007, has now released details of his policy plans. The policy relates to a study which was carried out, under the auspices of the Commission, by the UK National Centre for Languages.⁴

The study revealed that the lack of foreign-language skills is causing large numbers of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) substantial business problems. That lack is identified as the reason why as many as 11 % of them have lost current contracts and an equal proportion did not get contracts in the first place. The average loss is estimated at € 325,000 per SME per year.

Those findings are among the foundations on which Mr Urban rests his new policy for multilingualism in the EU. One of his aims is to make the promotion of foreign-language skills an important component of EU innovation policy. It is an interesting idea, yet the mysterious thing about it is that he places the burden primarily on the regions to stimulate the companies to take the necessary action. It is also essential, he stresses, not to restrict oneself to two or three world languages, but to foster skills in many other languages as well.

This is not an unrealistic goal. As many citizens of the EU speak only one language, they are not actually challenged, linguistically, and therefore a lot more can be expected of them than is commonly believed. There are, however, a few conditions. An important one is that an environment congenial to foreign languages needs to be created and that there is maximum contact with foreign languages, for example by showing films, TV interviews etc. in the original with subtitles. In general I always get the impression in Germany that everything possible is done to ensure that Germans have the least possible contact with other languages. It is the only real explanation for all the hysteria about foreign words being imported into German. The aversion to foreign languages, which is prevalent in other EU countries too, is something we must guard against, not least because any discussion of a common language is academic in the truest sense of the word. There is no common language, there never will be and, most important, there never should be.

A lingua franca, on the other hand, we most definitely do need. It is called English. This requires no further explanation provided we first understand that a lingua franca is a means of communication. It is not a substitute for one's own

4 De Standaard, 24 February 2007, E2–E3.

language, but it does enable people to communicate who would not be able to if they used their own language. English therefore is neither a rival competing with the mother tongue nor a language we choose to use in order to do the British a favour. It is simply the only language which fulfils the conditions required of a lingua franca, just as Latin did, for centuries on end. That is why I chose Latin for the title of my essay.

Because, as I have said, EU citizens tend to be linguistically under-stretched, what the EU must do is promote not only the learning of English but also the acquisition of other foreign languages. Alongside English and the mother tongue there is plenty of space for other languages, and there are reasons enough for learning them. Furthermore, a generalised multilingualism is the only way to forestall absolute domination by English. Perhaps one can reduce it to a simple prescription: you need English anyway, you should at all costs have command of at least one other foreign language, and you should nurture and care for your mother tongue.

Detailed research over the last few decades into the teaching of foreign languages has made it perfectly clear what needs to be done to improve results, which are in many cases unsatisfactory. It is, however, just as clear that the best teaching methods are insufficient if the motivation is not good enough. Action must also be taken to enable those who have gained a command of a foreign language to remain in contact with it thereafter. The first task of the EU and its member states, therefore, is to ensure that there is an increase in motivation and that the right climate is created, so that the largest possible number of people will understand the urgency of improving people's foreign language skills.

I cannot really deal with the subject properly here, but while we are on the subject of language planning in the EU a word needs to be said about the languages of immigrants. Not only many immigrants, but also many of their children who were born here in Europe, speak languages that do not occur in the EU. Ways must be sought of making it possible for them to perfect their knowledge of their mother tongue. We cannot afford to make the mistake of the Americans, who first use all available means to alienate immigrants from their mother tongues (former President Ronald Reagan used to say that speaking foreign languages is an un-American activity) and subsequently have to spend a lot of money on foreign-language teaching, which in most cases is not very successful.

The language skills of these children must also be properly valued and appreciated. It happens all too often that a little boy or girl who, for example, speaks Russian, Georgian and a little English and can also make correct use of both the Cyrillic and the Latin alphabet is treated as an untaught child with no language skills. Sometimes, indeed, such children are classified as not ready to start school.

A general conclusion that can be drawn is that it is imperative to make it clear to Europeans that monolingualism is not the norm and bilingualism the exception. These two fallacies are in most cases believed even by people who themselves

demonstrate a high degree of bilingual competence. It is therefore important to realise that statistically, and taking a world view, it is not monolingualism but bi- and multilingualism that is the rule.

As my colleague in Brussels, Hugo Baetens Beardsmore, told the European Parliament, at least part of the explanation can be found in “the history of the major countries, in their colonial past, in the education systems they developed and in a type of cultural imperialism which claims, *inter alia*, incorrectly, that the fewer languages there are, the better political unity will function”. Like him I am convinced that, regrettably, “thought patterns of that kind, even though now perhaps in a weaker form, still determine the policies of the EU, whether the Union admits to it or not”.⁵

4. Conclusions

I wish to conclude by setting out some of the arguments that follow from my essay:

1. In processes of identity formation, “changing and/or competing identifications must be expected”. Language is only one of the elements identified with, and it is not always the most important.
2. The linguistic diversity of the European Union cannot, on its own, help to create a European identity. But it is not in opposition to this either. On the other hand, an attempt must be made to improve the multilingual competence of EU citizens to the point where polyglot behaviour in language-contact situations come to be seen as a hallmark of the EU.
3. It is important that an environment congenial to foreign languages be created and that there should be maximum contact with foreign languages. The promotion of multilingualism and the learning of foreign languages will help to ensure that other languages besides English are regarded as valuable and important.
4. In some countries, language policy and planning are aimed at enhancing national identity by denying a role to minority languages and by promoting only the so-called national language. Whether this serves to strengthen a sense of European identity is open to question.
5. Areas with regional or minority languages hope the EU will grant them a degree of autonomy that their own national state, in most cases, does not allow them. In many of these areas, the frosty relationship they have with the sense

5 From the unpublished manuscript of the speech of Hugo BAETENS BEARDSMORE before the European Parliament on 26 January 1994, under the title “Het recht op het gebruik van zijn eigen taal” [“The right to use one’s own language”].

of national identity could very well lead to a stronger commitment to European identity. But there is no uniformity regarding the role played by language.

6. And finally, a very general point: even in cases where language seems to be of the greatest importance, one should bear in mind that there are always other factors involved and that they can often play a more decisive role. In the large majority of cases of conflict of interests it must be said that language is more a symptom than the actual cause.