Toward a plurilingual urban environment: Language policy and language planning in Brussels

Roland Willemyns

1. Brussels is Belgium's capital and largest city and, consequently, it meets the qualifications of the so-called "bilingual urban environment", which it shares with a considerable number of other cities all over the world. Sociolinguistic research on such cities has coined the term "urban multilingualism" and as a kind of introduction I would like to briefly elaborate on that notion. The preliminary question should be raised if there is a sociolinguistic methodology governing the investigation, description, analysis, explanation etc. of multilingualism as it occurs in an urban environment in which various languages or language variants are in daily use.

A positive answer would imply that the multilingual situations in urban environments - in any urban environments for that matter - have enough in common to serve as a basis for the establishment of such a research methodology. To my knowledge this has never been truly demonstrated. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the bi- or multilingual situation in pairs of urban environments deserves to be compared. It is rather easy to point out similarities between the situations in, say, Brussels and Montreal, Barcelona and Helsinki, Montreal and Singapore or Barcelona and Brussels. The real question, though, is whether such similarities go beyond the level of idiosyncrasies? The concept of urban bilingualism has been used in the title of the volume published by the research center of my Brussels university (V.U.B.) in an attempt to present a synthesis of its interdisciplinary research findings (Witte and Baetens Beardsmore 1987). The neighboring concept of "The Bilingual City" has been used for a book planned by Cobarrubias, Mackey and Ornstein which, however, has never been actually published.

The fact that the theoretical concept has not been made practically operational so far may be a consequence of the lack of theoretical or methodological elaboration on it and we might ask the question whether
undeniable similarities as far as the genesis, the evolution and the present-day situation of multilingualism in some specific urban environments might not justify the establishment of a common investigation method and explanatory device. On the other hand, as Van de Craen and Baetens Beardsmore (1987: 579) observe "a host of language varieties co-exist both in terms of social stratification and in terms of geographical dispersion", it is not obvious that systematization and categorization are the methods to be envisaged. A multidisciplinary approach is certainly necessary and, consequently, it is rather unlikely that such a demanding investigation in a significantly large number of cases might be carried out in a way comparable and similar enough to provide the justification of so bold an enterprise.

2.

One of the weaker points of the synthesis (Witte and Baetens Beardsmore 1987) already mentioned, as Kenneth McRae observes in a review of that book, is that "there is no integrated model for application to other urban settings, and no convenient listing of hypotheses for testing elsewhere" (McRae 1988: 465). His "own ideal research (model)", he adds, would be to "supplement what has already been provided with more data on the status of the languages (both historically and through current surveys), on linguistic aspirations and motives of the various groups in question, on perceptions of the local and national power structures and of language needs for career mobility, and on the perceived fairness of the system in a linguistic sense" (McRae 1988). Since much of this, as McRae agrees, has already been accomplished, my primary concern is not a lack of data but of turning the existing information into an "integrated model". Consequently, I shall limit the scope of this paper to a discussion of some more or less recent developments in Brussels (mainly in the field of "perceptions of the local and national power structures and of language needs for career mobility"), after which I will try to formulate some conclusions which, hopefully, may serve as "hypotheses for testing elsewhere".

3.

From the nineteen thirties onward Belgium has gradually turned to the territoriality principle model (McRae 1975) in order to come to terms with the linguistic diversity in the country at large and to accommodate the various linguistic groups (Van de Craen and Willeminys 1988). The fact that, after various constitutional changes in 1970, 1980, 1988 and 1993 (Alen and
Suetens 1993), it has eventually been anchored in the constitution, has officialized the language border as a domestic administrative border, has made it virtually unchangeable and has accomplished the linguistic homogeneity of the language groups and regions. Gradually most members of these groups have come to realize that this is the neatest and the most practical and elegant way of handling multilingualism within the confines of national borders.

The most important exception to the territoriality rule is Brussels, where there is no geographical demarcation of Dutch and French speakers and, consequently, the personality principle is the only possible one. Yet, even then we see that the situation of the country at large and the status of the languages present in that country have a direct influence on the situation in such an urban environment. This is not only the case in Brussels but, as is shown by a quick typological comparison, with Montreal and Barcelona as well:

- Brussels is an officially bilingual city in which the languages in use are official languages nationwide and the personality principle is used as opposed to the territorial governed country at large;

- Montreal is a de facto bilingual city, yet part of an officially monolingual autonomous region of an officially bilingual country. Consequently, although the two languages in actual use are the official languages of Canada at large, Montreal is officially not bilingual and there is no problem in applying the territoriality principle as far as the provincial competence is concerned. The personality principle applies, though, for everything pertaining to the competence of the federal, Canadian government, since this is the policy of Ottawa for the country at large;

- finally the situation in Barcelona is different still. With Montreal and Brussels it has in common the lack of territorial demarcation. With Brussels it has in common that both languages are in official use. A distinguishing factor, though, is that the officiality of Catalan is restricted to the autonomous region it is part of and that it does not function as an official language of the country at large (at least not yet!).

Consequently, none of the three capitals has the same bilingual status.
4.

Since often function and status of the languages in multilingual settings are unstable, language maintenance and language shift are the major points of interest for the linguist. I shall, therefore, concentrate this presentation on two aspects, i.e. language planning meant to control or determine language shift and maintenance on the one hand, and, on the other hand, (changing) attitudes towards bilingualism as a function of prestige shift as far as status and function of the co-occurring and competing languages are concerned.

4.1.

Brussels has a history of language shift. The Frenchification process of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century has been extensively documented (Witte and Baetens Beardsmore 1987) and will, consequently, not be analyzed again. One of the striking aspects is that, during recent decades, Brussels has witnessed a radical change as far as its position within the Belgian constitutional framework is concerned and as far as the relationship between its linguistic communities is concerned. Also, the Frenchification process as it had existed until the nineteen sixties has considerably slowed down or even stopped.

4.2.

In 1987 De Vriendt and I concluded our paper on "Linguistic Research on Brussels" the following way (De Vriendt and Willeymys 1987: 228):

Combining with the higher esteem for Dutch as a result of the economic revival of Flanders and the awareness of the necessity of bilingual skills for all higher public and private offices, this accounts for a considerable rise of the prestige of Dutch in Brussels. We may, therefore, predict that in the future Standard French and Standard Dutch will be the two prestige languages of the bilingual capital.

How has this change been brought about? The first factor mentioned in the quotation, viz. the "economic revival of Flanders" has been extremely important.

During the last three to four decades the economic center of gravity in Belgium shifted from the South to the North of the country (Flanders) entailing major shifts in the political, social, cultural and linguistic fields as
well. From the late fifties onwards a dramatic industrial development was witnessed in Flanders, turning this formally agricultural territory into a highly industrialized region, largely dominating the political, social and economic scene. At the same time the outdated industrial structure of Wallonia was slowly breaking down, giving way to a serious economic recession. Just a few significant figures may exemplify this:

(a) Belgium is the top exporting country in the world (pro capita) and according to recent figures 73% of all export products are manufactured in Flanders (Deprez 1988: 10);

(b) Wallonia produces no more than 26% of the Gross National Product (Knack, January 13, 1992, p.7);

(c) As far as the job market is concerned, we see that during the decade from 1978 to 1988 employment increased by 3.7% in Flanders, while it decreased by 7.8% in Brussels and by no less than 14.3% in Wallonia.

This has influenced considerably the cultural and linguistic balance of power and has enabled Flemings to achieve more in recent decades than during the whole of the preceding century, as far as their linguistic and cultural claims are concerned (Willemyns 1988: 1255) and has been the main factor contributing to a shift of linguistic prestige in the direction of Dutch (Willemyns 1992). Furthermore, the territoriality principle making Flanders an officially monolingual Dutch speaking territory made the practical consequences of economic shift felt earlier and more intensive. This combination of linguistic legislation (or language planning) and economic evolution also influenced the situation in Brussels, even though the territoriality principle is not effective there. As Mackey (1981: 25) observes:

... as the Francophones of Canada and the Flemings of Belgium gain in economic, political, cultural and social importance, so has French in Montreal and Dutch in Brussels.

5.

The capital, by force, undergoes the consequences of the changes in the nation at large, in spite of its own specific linguistic and constitutional status as I will now try to demonstrate.
5.1.

There certainly has been a lot of language planning attempts in Brussels. On the one hand there is evidence that the former Frenchification has not always been a "spontaneous" consequence of upward social mobility: legislation as well as practical measures concerning the communal system of education and instruction e.g. have directly increased the Frenchification (even if certain measures were not exactly intended that way; Van Velt-Cist 1987). On the other hand there has been the continuing efforts of the Dutch speakers to at least change some of the factors that were believed to be the motor of Frenchification. The main difference between both kinds of attempts at interfering is not only that, for a long time at least, the efforts of the former were more successful than those of the latter group but also that the planning devices to slow down Frenchification were not made possible through local regulations but had to be implemented via the national administration. It is mainly by linguistic legislation on the level of the Belgian legislator that the attempts were made and it is definitely only on that level that they ever were successful.

5.1.1.

In the years immediately following the second World War the defenders of the Dutch cause in Brussels realized that the only way to stop Frenchification was the installment of monolingual networks and structures in the so-called "personified matters" ("persoonsgebonden materies") such as education, welfare, health care, recreational facilities, cultural institutions etc. This strategy was backed by the Flemish political establishment. Since, however, they lacked the political power to achieve this aim within the political structures of Brussels proper, its implementation could only be secured through national policy, as part of the negotiations between Dutch and French speakers in Belgium at large. A significant change in the linguistic make up of the capital and the relationship between its linguistic communities has only been brought about from the moment onwards that the nation's Dutch speakers have consented to abandon some or all of the advantages of being the majority group in the country at large in order to protect or strengthen the position of the minority group they had become in the nation's capital. After the body of linguistic legislation passed in 1963 (the so-called Hertogmiennial-agreement) and the first change of the constitution in 1970, the gain of abandoning parity on the national scale has been:
(a) the parity in the administration of Brussels' 19 communes. The number of high ranking city administrators has increased from 11.2% Dutch and 88.8% French speakers in 1963, over 28.1% against 71.9% in 1970 to 49.2% Dutch and 50.8% French speakers in 1979 (Willemyns 1992).

(b) the number of Dutch speaking schools in Brussels has been considerably extended and different (less rigid) norms have been applied for the preservation of Dutch classes and schools. Let me provide you with some figures: creches and nursery schools from 32 to 321, elementary schools from 76 to 151, secondary schools from 13 to 89 between 1940 and 1979. Also, we have to consider the rise of the population in the Dutch language schools of 44.7% from 1979 to 1988 (Deprez and Wynants 1989).

(c) the installment of the Nederlandse Cultuurcommissie (NCC) (Dutch Culture Board) guaranteeing that cultural organizations and the entire organization of Dutch cultural life in the capital would be managed and, consequently, fostered by Dutch speakers themselves.

(d) the set-up of monolingual networks and structures in the so-called personified matters.

all of this regardless of the numeral minority position of Dutch speakers or of election turnouts. Incidentally, the undeniable success of similar language planning measures also proves that in such matters the "market mechanism" apparently has not always to be the governing principle: the attendance of Dutch schools or the participation in Dutch cultural life and manifestations increased considerably from the moment onwards that more dispositions were set into place. So it was definitely the supply that increased the demand.

5.1.2.

The constitutional changes of 1980, 1988 and 1993 changed the position of Brussels within the Belgian state and entailed important consequences for the linguistic balance of power in the capital. As soon as it became clear that the federalization of the country could not be stopped anymore but was on the contrary going to expand rapidly, francophone activists in Brussels adopted a new strategy. Instead of continuing to be fierce advocates of "unitarianism" they now claimed a statute for Brussels as a third "region"
(in the constitutional sense), equal to the already existing Flemish and Walloon regions. This claim was supported by the Walloons and opposed by the Flemings. Yet, it was largely the francophone option that prevailed. As a kind of compensation the Dutch speaking Brusselers were given some kind of vetoing power. In the Brussels government, where there is parity between both language groups, decisions have to be made unanimously and in the assembly, bills affecting language, culture and other "personified matters" require a majority in both language factions (Wiite 1993: 563). It is obvious that this will influence the cohabitation of the language groups considerably and, here again, the decision making has originated from the national and not from the local administration.

5.1.3.

Another and definitely not less important way in which the capital undergoes the consequences of changes outside its territory has to do with an important shift in attitudes and political strategy in Wallonia, viz. the gradual withdrawal of the Walloons to their own territory, not wanting an involvement with Brussels and the periphery to interfere with their own problems, c.q. not wanting to risk their own future for a very unpredictable alliance with French speakers in and around the capital. This is a move not unlike the one of the Quebequers abandoning the fate of French speakers scattered all over Canada in order to secure the monolingual character of their own province. Also it seems to mirror a situation that has existed before. In former articles I have listed as one of the reasons for the Frenchification of Brussels the fact that the so-called "Flemish Movement" was so very much preoccupied with the situation in Flanders proper that they lacked the energy and the influence to interfere in Brussels. Something similar might now apply to the Walloons: they are so very much preoccupied with their own poor economy and disastrous financial situation that they lack the energy and the influence to do more than minding their own business instead of remaining involved in and with Brussels. I assume that the newspaper De Standaard\(^2\) expresses a general feeling when writing: "The Wallonia-Brussels axis does not exist anymore. After every new government we witness that the "French speaking community" (i.e. "la communauté française") is gradually being dismantled to the profit of the Walloon region (i.e. "la région wallonne"), which is evolving into a community even a nation."

And indeed we increasingly hear Walloon politicians state that withdrawing behind their own borders may be the most beneficiary thing to do. After several of the highest ranking Walloon officials had repeatedly claim-
ed that the "French Community" was in fact an outdated concept, a useless burden that had to be dismantled in favor of a "région wallonne" and a "région bruxelloise", the dismantling has effectively taken place, leaving hardly more than some symbolic functions for the "communauté française". Probably this process will eventually end with a francophone situation mirroring the one on the Dutch speaking side, viz. a merger of "community" and "region".

It is pretty obvious to anyone that this means the end of solidarity of Wallonia with the Brussels Francophones who are, indeed, aware of the fact that they may have no choice but turn to Flanders and, thus, politically make the same move they had been making economically for some decades already. The French language magazine Le Vif/L'Express phrased their dilemma the following way: "Riches et Flamands ou pauvres et Wallons?" (Rich and Flemish or poor and Wallon?).

Obviously this will continue to influence both the language attitudes in Brussels and the subsequent linguistic situation and once again we are in the presence of policy and legislation not situated on the local level but taken by outside authorities. In other words, Brussels undergoes the consequences of changes in the national situation instead of, as has often been the case in the past, determining them.

5.2. Bilingualism

My second point of discussion is bilingualism, both on the individual and on the societal level. By any standard and by any definition Brussels is a bilingual city not because various parts of the population speak different languages but because two languages are both in official and in private use all over the city. Yet, we all know that this doesn’t mean that all citizens display bilingual skills. In an earlier paper De Vriendt and I, following Baetens Beardsmore (1981), discerned six different categories of Brusselers according to their mastery of the languages and the use they make of them in various domains, settings and with various kinds of interlocutors (De Vriendt and Willemyns 1987: 214-221).

Both the mastery and the use of the "other language" depend on a multitude of factors and the same goes for the efforts to acquire second language skills. Yet, in both cases attitudes play a very important role and one might advance the thesis that, the more positive the attitudes, the more the language in question is likely to be used and learned. Fishman has phrased this as follows: the weak are always more likely to be bilingual than the strong! (Fishman 1987).
It is interesting to find out if and how this applies to Brussels and to compare the capital in this respect with the general tendencies of the country. In both cases we are handicapped by a lack of exact data but, then, this is a matter in which so-called "hard evidence" is almost impossible to provide, so much so that one ought to be a little suspicious whenever it is nonetheless offered.

One thing is perfectly clear: in the past it used to be the case that, both in Brussels and in Belgium at large, bilingual skills were abundantly present in Dutch speakers but very restricted in French speakers. This is perfectly in line with Fishman's statement and, as a consequence of the prestige shift mentioned earlier, we should now be able to discern a shift here as well. There are, indeed, quite some indications in this direction. Although the gap between the two regions as far as the familiarity with each other's situation is concerned is rapidly widening4 we seem to be in the presence of a distinct shift in the search for bilingual skills. I could start with a statement of the vice-chairman of the Belgian House of Representatives (De Standaard, October, 16 1989):

In the past Flemish Representatives were, almost by definition, bilingual, whereas Walloons didn't need any other language than French. Yet, today the proficiency in French of Dutch speaking Representatives is diminishing whereas more and more French speaking ones get proficient in Dutch. It is not at all excluded that pretty soon it will be the French speaking Representatives who will take the lead as far as bilingual competence is concerned.

and I could multiply this kind of statements, which I won't do. I will, instead, restrict myself to only two, yet interesting ones. The first comes from an article in the French language magazine Le Vif/L'Express. Bearing, interestingly enough, the Dutch title "Waarom niet in Vlaanderen studeren?" (Why not study in Flanders?) it states that, since Dutch is no longer considered la langue de l'ennemi (the language of the enemy)5 not only are large numbers of Walloons going through considerable efforts to acquire the language of their Flemish compatriots but there are even students who enlist in Dutch language universities to be sure to acquire a perfect command of Dutch. The second testimony by Guy Janssens, a professor of Dutch at the French language university of Liège, gives a clear summary of what is generally felt in the whole country: "Whereas the Flemings appear to display a lack of interest for Wallonia and French, the Walloons, on the contrary, show the opposite tendency: their interest in Flanders, the Flemings and the Dutch language is constantly growing" (Janssens 1992: 561-562).
Manifestations of this increasing interest, Janssens says, are that parents' associations are organizing supplementary Dutch classes for pupils of elementary schools and that the enlisting for Dutch evening classes, summer schools and crash courses has reached heights unseen before (Janssens 1992: 563). How does all this affect the linguistic situation in Brussels? The closer to the language border, the more vivid the interest in Dutch and what Janssens says for Wallonia applies to a much greater extent still for Francophone Brusselers. This is corroborated by a report in the newspaper De Standaard (February 20, 1995). Research on the quality and efficiency of the instruction of Dutch in francophone schools in Wallonia and Brussels inspires the paper to the title "Dutch in francophone schools is thriving" and the subtitle "Dutch or no job", the latter statement being the obvious explanation of the former one. Let me illustrate this with a little anecdote: Two major Brussels newspapers Het Laatste Nieuws and Het Nieuwsblad had in their edition of August 25, 1989, the story of a small but incorrigible thief who was sentenced in a Brussels court. When the (French speaking) judge asked the (French speaking) thief why he did not try to find an honest job instead of stealing, the man's answer was: "That's impossible, Your Honor. One cannot find a job in Brussels unless one can speak Dutch." Did he only try to save his neck or is he basically right? Probably both!

This seems to be contradicted, though, by Baetens Beardsmore's statement that Flanders' increasing economic resources made it possible to put up structures in Brussels which enabled "the individual to function as a unilingual. Schools, hospitals, welfare services, cultural instances, recreational facilities have all been set up to service either community in its own language. Hence the institutional pressures to Frenchification have been eliminated and ... the minority speaker (was enabled) to maintain his ethno-linguistic identity" (Baetens Beardsmore 1990: 5). Obviously this holds true for the majority speaker as well as De Vriendt and Van de Craen (1987) try to demonstrate by mentioning what they call a paradox. The basic assumption of all constitutional changes of the past decades, they rightly observe, is that a Belgian citizen is part of either the French or the Dutch speaking community. The ultimate consequence is that, in the only region which is officially termed bilingual, the individual has no means of being acknowledged as a bilingual citizen. "It would appear therefore", they state, "that the nature of language planning in Brussels is to curb bilingualism rather than encourage it". Yet, there are reasons and incentives for not wanting to live and function monolingually. From the fifties onwards linguistic legislation was finally also implemented in Brussels. The support for Dutch speaking "Brusselers" and the installment of an impressive infrastructure for the Brussels Dutch speaking community enabled them to maximally profit from the gain in prestige the
language had acquired in the country at large. Brussels' French speaking community and its economically and socially leading strata realized that the most important and best paid jobs were only to be available for bilinguals and consequently made serious efforts to either learn the language or to reactivate the psychologically repressed knowledge they already had. The figures on school attendance mentioned before are proof in themselves: we may add that there are waiting lists for adult classes providing instruction in Dutch (Deprez and Wynants 1989). Inquiries on attitudes also prove the increased prestige of Dutch and the importance attached to bilingual competence (De Vriendt and Willeyns 1987: 224-228).

Sometimes this may entail completely unpredictable consequences. The reinstallment, after "Hertoginnedal", of the so-called "freedom of the head of the family", meaning that Dutch speaking families could choose French education for their children and vice versa, was very much feared by supporters of the Dutch cause in Brussels who expected language shift to be increased by it. Surprisingly enough, it appears to be the "heads" of French speaking families who, to an ever increasing extent, use their "freedom" to choose Dutch education for their children. Consequently, pupils in the Dutch schools increasingly originate from linguistically mixed or homogeneously French speaking households, as is shown in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nursery schools</th>
<th>Elementary schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- homogeneously Dutch speaking families</td>
<td>34 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- linguistically mixed families</td>
<td>28 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- homogeneous &quot;other language&quot; families</td>
<td>38 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures were provided by the Minister of Education in the Brussels' Regional Government, Mr. R. Griep, who also announced that non-Dutch speakers will be helped by speech therapists in 18 schools with more than 50% non-Dutch speakers. Interestingly he added that a pilot project also starts providing Dutch language lessons to the parents of these children.

This evolution will probably be strengthened by a group of the population which has not been discussed so far, viz. the foreign immigrants. Since, for most of this group (which has reached some 30% of the overall population to date) French used to be their first "Belgian" language, their linguistic habits have contributed to the conviction that speaking French is
no longer to be equated with being well-to-do. Combined with the very visible fact that more and more members of the social and economic elite are Dutch speakers this has contributed to break down the traditional pattern of language prestige (Willeyns 1992). Consequently, the current manifestation of linguistic prestige in Brussels is to be competent in both the Dutch and the French standard languages and to propagate bilingualism as a core value (as defined in Smolicz 1981). In a 1984 survey by the French language Brussels newspaper Le Soir 45.9% of the respondents claimed to have a "good" or "very good" command of the "other language", 39.4% "a little" and 14.2% "not at all".

In Belgium in general and in Brussels in particular the linguistically based regional antagonism has slowly turned away from the so-called conflict model to the so-called cooperation model (Van de Craen 1987). This turned Wallonia and Flanders into strictly monolingual territories and transfers Brussels gradually into "a genuine bilingual city by having bilingualism adopted as a core value by its inhabitants" (Van de Craen 1987: 86).

Let me conclude this paper by trying to formulate, as I promised, some "hypotheses for testing elsewhere":

(a) The prestige of competing languages in a bilingual urban setting is depending on the prestige of the languages in the country at large, even if the status and function are different and if, typologically, the bilingual situation is different from that in the country itself.

(b) Language planning and linguistic legislation may be more successful if situated at the national rather than at the local level.

(c) Stopping or reversing language shift is more likely to succeed if a prestige shift has been engaged by a shift in economic and political power and is accompanied and backed by adequate language planning measures.

(d) Linguistic legislation should aim at the installment of durable institutions enabling the members of the minority language group to function monolingually if they chose to do so, thus giving them every opportunity to maintain their ethnolinguistic identity. An adequate educational system appears to be extremely important in this respect.
Notes

4. The president of the Belgian Senate, Mr. F. Swaelen, e.g., deplores that “politicians on both sides don’t read each others newspapers anymore, don’t watch each others political programs on television and are, in one word, unaware of what lives in the public opinion on the other side of the language border” (De Standaard, October 18, 1991).
5. Le Vif/L’Express, November 9, 1990: 58-60.
6. “Het gaat goed met Nederlands in het Franstalig onderwijs”.
7. “Nederlands of geen job”.
8. “il n’est pas possible de se faire reconnaître comme individu bilingue”.
9. “Il apparaît que la planification linguistique à Bruxelles est de nature à freiner le bilinguisme et non à le favoriser”.
10. The English language seems to have no appropriate term to designate the “inhabitant of Brussels”; since, however, a similar term can hardly be missed, “Brusseler” will be used to fill this lacuna.
11. Figures provided by Mr. R. Grijp, Minister of Education in the Brussels Regional Government and published in the newspaper De Morgen (October 1, 1991).
12. see also Leman (1988).
13. The phenomenon seems not to be restricted to Brussels. De Morgen (September 10, 1991) has a statement of the mayor of the Flemish language border commune Spiere that 60% of the pupils of his Dutch language communal elementary school originate from French speaking families.

References


Van de Craen, Pete 1987 The cooperation versus the conflict model or the problem of bilingualism in Belgium. ARLA-papers 11: 79-90.


